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question whether the posited technology-structure relationships under conventional automation remain applicable.
The different performance capabilities of hard automation and soft, programmable automation may also reflect different strategic motives. Conventional hard automation has been the favored vehicle for attaining cost leadership, increasing the firm's capacity for producing standardized goods through greater roufinization, predictability, and control over the work flow (Porter, 1980) . The technical capabilities of PA also make it possible to pursue a strategy of product differentiation or focus (Goldhar, Jelinek, & Schlie, 1991 ). Not only is it possible for fLrmS to pursue strategic alternatives that were not possible with traditional hard automation, but they can also pursue multiple strategies, such as cost leadership and differentiation simultaneously, without getting "stuck in the middle" (Dean & Susman, 1989; Porter, 1980) . Soft automation renders moot some of the issues surrounding the inherent tradeoffs associated with hard automation, such as choosing lower production costs over flexibility; this form of technology reduces costs and increases flexibility. These two kinds of technology have different capabilities, reducing the importance of controlling for business-level strategies, as this form of automation allows firms to reduce costs and differentiate simultaneously.
Programmable automation should also be distinguished from data and informarion processing technology which is used primarily in administrative functions. Scholars have argued that the latter technology: (1) centralizes decision making; (2) decentralizes decision making; (3) has no effect on decision making; and / or (4) reflects preexisting decision-making structures (George & King, 1991) . Without further clarification of the meaning of power and types of decision making, the PA-centralization debate could arrive at a similar, indeterminate view.
Programmable Automation and Power
Research on technology and the structure of power has considered two related dimensions of the structure of power in organizations: (1) the number of levels in the organization's hierarchy; and (2) the level at which decisions are made within that hierarchy. Technology can alter the length of the hierarchy by making some functions unnecessary, yet leave power concentrated at the top, or vice-versa. What, then, are the purported effects?
Hierarchy
The consensus of opinion is that PA results in flatter organization structures as evidenced by an absolute reduction in the number of vertical levels (Burris, 1989; Goldhar et al., 1991; Whisler, 1970; Zeffane, 1989; Zuboff, 1988) . Theoretical arguments have been advanced in support of three causes of this change: the reduced need for middle managers to act as information conduits, the decreased overall size of the workforce, and the simplification of the production-management role brought about by PA.
The central thrust of the information-based argument is that the informative capacity of PA makes middle-management positions redundant because upperlevel managers are able to extract pertinent information about production directly JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 PROGRAMMABLE AUTOMATION 33 from databases. This hypothesis was put forth as early as 1958 (Leavitt & Whisler, 1958) . Historically, decisions required involvement from several levels in the hierarchy, in part because each level had unique knowledge or decision-specific information (Meyer & Goes, 1988) . But, because information-based technologies facilitate vertical distribution of information and knowledge, fewer vertical levels now need to be involved (Huber, 1990) . With computer design tools, for example, the design process becomes less iterative and can be carried out entirely at higher levels, without contact with the shop floor (Shaiken, 1986) . Therefore, fewer middle-level managers are required to coordinate the flow of information. Zuboff (1988) has also observed from case studies that management typically uses the informative power of computer systems to bolster their power and knowledge of the organization, while intentionally reducing the number of middle-management positions. Noteworthy is this argument's underlying assumption that technology, in some way, integrates information and does not create information overload for senior managers.
The increased information-carrying capacity associated with technology is buttressed by the labor-saving capabilities of PA, which indirectly decrease the need for middle managers. Many studies of changes in hierarchies are confounded by the fact that often an overall decrease in number of employees, or a reduction in total labor units, accompanies automation (Huber, 1990) . These smaller organizations will, by definition, require fewer layers of management.
Managerial levels also decrease because production processes become easier to manage after the implementation of PA (Child, 1987) . First, the technology facilitates high machining quality and ready access to quality-control data, reducing the requirements for managerial oversight (Goldhar et al., 1991) . In addition, the increasing proportion of professional-technical personnel shifts the focus of the organization from hierarchical authority to expertise. Professionals are socialized to maintain high work standards without management's involvement and may actually resist such control as managerial instructions could conflict with professional norms (Hall, 1975) .
While the above studies share the view that automation (especially computer automation) flattens the organizational structure, systematic study of this phenomenon is absent. Theoretically based arguments and case studies are primarily used to support this perspective.
Locus of Power
Little agreement exists about whether PA will centralize or decentralize the locus of decision-making power within the hierarchy. We suggest that these differences rest on varying measures of technology and conceptions of power, and on inattention to organizations' history and context.
Centralization. Arguments for centralization tend to be based on the premise that managerial ideology drives both the selection of the technology and its application (Burris, 1989; Keen, 1985; Rule & Attewell, 1989; Shaiken, 1986; Whisler, 1970) . According to these theorists, managers seek to use technology to displace labor and control work processes. Managers implement PA because they want workers to have less power and discretion. Marsh (1992) examined the effect of automation on the centralization of authority in 48 Japanese manufacturing f'trms. His study examined the lowest level that has the authority to take action on decisions of all types without waiting for confirmation from above. He established that greater automation leads to a higher level of centralization. However, because of the method used to evaluate the level of automaticity, this study may be more a test of hard automation than of programmable automation, l and the cross-sectional nature of the data makes it impossible to determine how changes in the levels of programmable automation affect changes in the locus of decision-making authority. Rule and Attewell's (1989) cross-sectional survey of 184 relatively small New York City firms highlights the centralization argument. They found that 30% of these firms used some form of sophisticated, "highly transformative" computer application. Interview results showed that these computer systems were neither being used for qualitatively new types of work nor being used to apply science or new forms of theory to decision making. The tasks computerized were largely administrative (the most frequently automated areas were payroll, invoicing, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and word processing). Thus, these highly transformative, information-producing applications were being implemented to further empower managers, enabling stricter surveillance, greater "managerial control," and less "worker discretion." This study supports the earlier findings of Whisler (1970) , who found that centralization increased because information was more available to higher hierarchical levels. Shaiken (1986) contrasts conventional automation with computer-aided manufacturing in the design process in his qualitative study of technology. Conventional automation requires interaction between process designers and the shop floor, limiting what higher levels can do on their own. With computer-aided design, this is not the case; the entire design process can be carried out without substantive interaction with lower levels in the hierarchy. Automation was, thus, found to reduce the need to include lower-level functions in a process.
The above empirical pieces share a view of technology as a top-down system geared toward automating entire lower-level functions, or automating the information-gathering processes from lower levels. Theoretical pieces also support the centralization perspective. In the case of programmable automation, managers are assumed to collude with increasingly powerful system experts to program controls into system software, leaving workers with only the appearance of autonomy (Burris, 1989) . Furthermore, through PA, management is able to turn generalist, hands-on craft workers into narrowly defined, carefully monitored machine operators. The information capacity of this technology provides enhanced surveillance over the work itself. Managers, on the other hand, recognize the threat PA poses to their livelihoods and aspirations, and use this technology to protect themselves. Thus, regardless of whether the technology provides greater rigidity or flexibility, the result of its implementation is the same: greater control over lower ranking managers and rank and file workers. Hence, according to this view, investment in new technology means greater centralization and control.
Decentralization. Arguments for decentralization assume that technical logic drives the choice and use of technology. If a technology is flexible, for exam-JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 pie, management will capitalize on this feature by developing a complementary structure. Thus, the flexibility and informational power of programmable automation will result in more decentralized organizations (Quinn & Paquette, 1990; Schein, 1989; Withington, 1969; Zeffane, 1989) . The rationale is that technology's ability to facilitate information exchange, enhance worker expertise, and simplify managerial tasks reduces the need for managers. Lower-or middle-level managers are unnecessary because policies and instructions can be communicated from distant upper management (Blau et al., 1976; Quilm & Paquette, 1990; Withington, 1969) . At the same time, operators are able to be more responsive to customers, relying on computerized contingency menus instead of personal advice from supervisors. Zeffane (1989) provides one of the best tests of this thesis. His survey data from 1983 show that higher levels of computer use were correlated with decentralization. This study distinguishes among four categories of decisions, including operational and strategic. These categories are used in measuring the effect of computer use on 14 administrative functions, one of which is production and production scheduling/control. While this study does not specifically isolate computer-controlled automation in manufacturing from other operational uses, it does show an overall decentralizing effect of computers on operational decisions. Zeffane also found that the use of computers for operational purposes had an insignificant effect on overall strategic decisions. This study, then, finds that operational decisions are decentralized, while strategic decisions remain unchanged with operational uses of computers. These findings were strongest across large work units. Zeffane's (1989) study takes several important steps forward in the study of the role of computers and power by distinguishing between the effects of computer usage on strategic and operational decisions. However, it combines the use of computers in production tasks with the use of computers in administrative tasks, such as stock control and operational research. Thus, the relationship between computer-controlled automation in manufacturing and decentralization remains unexplored. Dean and Susman (1989) hypothesize similar results. In their theoretical analysis of the effects of automated manufacturing technology, they hypothesize that design and implementation decisions become more centralized, while operational decisions become more decentralized. The decentralization of operational decisions is a result of the increased complexity and novelty of the machines in use. The operators themselves become the experts on their machines, possessing more knowledge than even their supervisors. Accordingly, they become the most qualified to make applicable operating choices, effectively decentralizing power at lower organizational levels. These results were supported by case studies. Burkhardt and Brass (1990) also empirically examine the impact of technology on power. Though this study' s unit of analysis was the individual and not the organization, its finding that new technologies change personal influence is important. Burkhardt and Brass noted that structure and power significantly changed following technological change. Being central and powerful prior to adoption was not related to early adoption. The hypothesized relationship that those who were JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 early adopters would become more central was borne out by the data. Interestingly, though, those who were powerful and central prior to new technological adoption were not totally displaced by the early adopters. Power and centrality were more dispersed following technological adoption because those in power previously began to share some of that power with those instrumental in adapting to technological change.
Synthesis ofPA and power relationships. All of the above views share a common expectation that technology will flatten the organizational hierarchy. The unresolved issue is how power will be distributed. The range of studies that support both the centralization and the decentralization hypotheses shows that the relationship may depend on contrasting formal and informal power, and the content of the decision domain. The B urkhardt and Brass (1990) longitudinal study shows that changes in informal power, measured as influence, do accompany changes in technology. And the Zeffane (1989) and Dean and Susman (1989) studies demonstrate that operational and strafegic decisions are affected differently. Existing research further indicates that different forms of automation may influence power distribution differently.
With the exception of the Burkhardt and Brass (1990) work, these studies share either a cross-sectional or case-study approach to data gathering. The findings discussed are the result of measuring decentralization and levels of technology and automation at one point in time. The impact of changes in levels of technology relative to the organizational hierarchy remains unexplored. The hierarchical changes are an especially salient issue because of the rapid rate of change of technology. Major changes in an organization's structure and power are often associated with (he implementation of new technology (Barley, 1986 (Barley, , 1990 . Thus, longitudinal studies that capture the corresponding change to structure and power in an environment of rapid implementation of a new form of technology may yield new insights.
Toward a Resolution
To understand the relationship between programmable automation (PA) and decentralization of decision-making, it is important to consider two related issues: (1) the characteristics of PA adopters; and (2) the diverse manifestations of decision-making power in manufacturing organizations. A more complete understanding of PA' s effects lies at the intersection of these issues.
Characteristics of PA Adopters
Innovation adopters have fairly distinct technical and organizational characteristics at the time of adoption (Damanpour, 1991) . First, PA is most likely to be adopted in batch-production systems that are already fairly flexible, so that some of the potential change in power resulting from PA's "greater flexibility" is offset by the extant production system's current level of flexibility (Collins, Hage, & Hull, 1988) . Second, fairly distinct structural characteristics are associated with different types of production systems, which may independently influence the structure of power. For example, technically oriented small-batch operations have JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 few hierarchical levels, and operating decisions are more decentralized within those levels (Hull & Collins, 1987) . Third, as discussed above, the unique characteristics of programmable automation (flexibility and information capacity) make it particularly attractive to those pursuing a strategy of increased flexibility. Such firms would implement programmable automation with a goal of decentralizing decision making so that the production process is more responsive. The strategies that would encourage the adoption of programmable automation favor an increased decentralization of the locus of decision making.
The importance of these contextual issues is illustrated in the writings of Child (1987) , Kelley (1990) , Burkhardt and Brass (1990), and Lachman (1989) . Child argued that firms adopting PA are most likely to empower workers when competitive advantage depends on product quality or service, labor markets are tight, tasks are complex, and work units are small. In a similar vein, Kelley's primary finding was that smaller, less structurally complex organizations were much more likely to allow blue-collar workers to take on PA programming tasks, leading to worker empowerment and, ultimately, to greater decentralization. Finally, Lachman, and Burkhardt and Brass, found that the strongest predictor of individual post-PA power was their original level of power, implying a strong inertial effect. These studies suggest that firms that adopt programmable automation are already decentralized relative to other organizations.
Diverse Manifestations of Decision-Making Power
The extent to which the above characteristics shape PA's effect on power depends greatly on the type of decision-making power being considered, i.e., authority vs. influence (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) , and the particular decision domain, i.e., strategic vs. operational (Jennergren, 1981) . The contradictory findings discussed above may be partially due to the failure to acknowledge these distinctions.
Authority and influence conceptualizations. Most of the technology-power
literature is concerned with legal-rational authority. This focus is perfectly valid, but it neglects a more dynamic type of power: influence. Legal-rational authority means that an individual has the right to act, or to demand that others act, according to his or her wishes (Weber, 1978) . In large, complex organizations, however, those with authority often rely on others for critical information and advice. This process gives the information provider some say in the final decision. For example, upper management may control the budget for new capital equipment, but rely on the advice of technicians and production personnel regarding when to buy and how to use the equipment.
Authority is based on position, is circumscribed, and is unidirectional (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) . Influence, in contrast, is based on persuasion, opportunity, and/or expertise, is uncircumscribed, and is multi-directional. These qualifies mean that authority is more difficult to change than is influence. Characteristics at the time of a firm's founding, such as the strategic decisionmaking authority vested in positions within the hierarchy, imprint the organization. For example, Boeker (1989) found that the relative importance of different functional areas at the time of a finn's founding imprinted the organization. It is JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 also noteworthy that the strategic process, which is defined as including the participants' patterns of behavior and the volume of diversity and information processed, becomes highly routinized and relatively inert over time (Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . One implication, then, is that the observed correlation between PA and authority may better reflect the conditions at the time of adoption than the conditions subsequent to adoption (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Lachman, 1989) . Another implication is that PA may differentially affect authority and influence (Barley, 1986) . Thus, deciphering the relationship between technology and power depends on examining authority and influence separately.
Decision-domain conceptualizations. The potential effects of PA may also vary according to whether the issues being considered are strategic or line-operational in nature. First, different types of decisions are already likely to be delegated to different degrees. Line-operating decisions are generally the first to be delegated because the locus of production knowledge at lower levels of the organization forces top management to delegate authority and extend the sphere of influence to lower levels (Gerwin, 1981; Jennergren, 1981) . Second, we expect thestructure of power for strategic decisions to be relatively more inert than for operating decisions (Boeker, 1989; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989) . Zeffane (1989) found that the use of computers affects operating and strategic decisions differently. Overall computer use, operational use of computers, and informational use of computers were correlated with decentralization of operational decision making but correlated with centralization of strategic decision making. In toto, these dynamics mean that PA is more likely to affect line-operating power, which is already relatively more decentralized, than the structure of power for strategic issues, which is typically more centralized.
Operationalizations of power. Though the explicit relationship between
programmable automation and the locus of decision-making power is untested, several studies that incorporate some element of programmable automation have measured decision-making power. These studies have operationalized power in different ways. Burkhardt and Brass (1990) , who examined the impact of early adoption of new technology on an individual's power, asked study participants to rate focal individuals (those with significant positions of network centrality) on a 5-point Likert-type scale according to the degree of influence the participants felt the focal individual had. This study did not examine an individual's actual ability to execute a decision, or the domain of the individual's power, but rather focused on the perception held by surrounding individuals. This study measured informal power, or influence, not formal authority. Marsh (1992) operationalized power by listing 37 recurring decisions and asking participants to note the lowest level of the organization that could make the decision without confirmation from others. Unlike Burkhardt and Brass (1990) , he looked at power through formal positions within the hierarchy, or authority. While Marsh did not specifically separate the different types of decisions made in his analysis of overall decentralization, he did note that decisions involving routine and localized questions tended to be most decentralized, while those on new prod-JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 ucts or expenditures and those affecting the overall organization tended to be the most centralized. Zeffane (1989) , in studying levels of computer use and decentralization, used a method similar to that of Marsh (1992) . He asked participants to indicate the level of the organization at which 14 types of decisions were normally made; he too defined power through formal position, or authority. Zeffane also separated decision domains. The 17 types of decisions were categorized as strategic, operational, staffing, or financial. These different operationalizations suggest that both informal power (influence) and formal power (authority) have an effect.
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses attempt to integrate the above ideas. Because the locus of decision-making authority and influence is expressed in both the number of levels in the hierarchy and the distribution within that hierarchy, our hypotheses follow in that order.
Hierarchy. We expect PA to lead to flatter organization structures. The technological capabilities of PA represent a significant opportunity for top management to reduce the number of layers in the hierarchy, and, other things being equal, they will in fact use PA to that end. PA gives top management some of the information it needs to partially offset the losses associated with a reduction in middle management, making these managers opportune targets during downsizing. The transition to an automated environment also requires the addition of technical and professional support staff to an already large administrative/managerial sector, putting added pressure on top management to find new ways to cut overhead. Based on these arguments, we expect to find that:
Ill: Greater use of programmable automation leads to fewer layers in the organizational hierarchy.
To address the issue of locus of power within the hierarchy, we examine all four permutations of authority and influence, and operating and strategic decisions.
Strategic authority and influence. The interplay of organizational inertia
and technological capabilities has a major impact on the locus of strategic authority and influence in a flatter organization, although the actual effects are very different for authority and influence.
If we accept Fredrickson and Iaquinto's (1989) conclusion that the strategic direction of the firm is relatively inert, then this highly centralized power would remain centralized. Also, top management work has undergone rationalization for nearly a century, so those activities amenable to explication were removed from their domain of concern long ago (Zuboff, 1988) . Top management's most critical contribution lies in its ability to chart the overall course of the organization based on a global understanding of the organization and its environment, making strategy the last function delegated. Based on this, we suggest that: While strategic authority will remain highly centralized even in a flattened organization, the same cannot be said of the sphere of strategic influence. By nature, influence is significantly more fluid and volatile than is authority, in that the structure of informal power in organizations is based primarily on persuasion, knowledge, and opportunity rather than on an institutionalized role. This suggests that PA's technical attributes more heavily counterbalance organizational inertia in shaping the locus of influence than they do in shaping the locus of authority.
If, as hypothesized above, PA reduces management layers, residual functions must be redistributed. It is doubtful that the strategic "influence void" resulting from the loss of middle management will be filled by first-line supervisors or workers lower in the organization. In adopting PA, the strategic apex is typically motivated by the desire to be responsive to changes in technologies and markets, which places heavy emphasis on interpreting highly technical and often ambiguous information. Therefore, upper management is likely to rely on an elite cadre of professional-technical advisors who understand not only the technical aspects of PA, but also the strategic implications of the data it presents. These advisors may also buttress the legitimacy of upper management in the face of shifting grounds of technical knowledge. These developments suggest that top-level staff functions may play an increased role in influencing and framing strategic decisions. Because these functions are relatively powerful and close to the strategic apex, we expect that:
H2b: Greater use of PA leads to a more centralized locus of strategic decision-making influence within the hierarchy.
Operational authority and influence. Organization characteristics also affect the delegation of authority for operational decisions. First, as noted above, organizations that have decentralized operational decisions are significantly more likely to adopt PA. The probability that the locus of operational authority will be left unchanged depends, then, on the extent to which the knowledge of remaining managers is still relevant. Studies by Burris (1989) and Keen (1985) indicate that the role of production managers in computer-intensive manufacturing operations is becoming less dependent on experiential knowledge and skills and more oriented toward the roles of liaison and facilitator. Thus, the traditional operational authority of these production managers would seem to rest on tenuous grounds.
Second, whereas adopters are often seeking to more closely couple their strategic and operational efforts, it would seem that the same group exerting influence in the strategic arena is likely to exercise some authority in the operational arena. Thus, the strategic thrust of PA adopters further erodes the power of production heads and pushes the locus of operational authority up in the organization. Therefore: JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 H3a: Greater use of PA leads to a more centralized locus of operational decision-making authority within the hierarchy.
Unlike operational authority, we expect influence concerning operational decisions to be located in lower levels of the organization. One reason is the changing skills of workers left to tend the PA machinery and equipment. PA operators develop new expertise in understanding PA-generated information, making their advice and input more valuable to management. Second, management's unfamiliarity with PA encourages them to listen to those working with it. Finally, to capitalize on PA's capacities, management will be encouraged to further decentralize the sphere of influence for operating decisions. Therefore:
H3b: Greater use of PA leads to a more decentralized locus of operational decision-making influence within the hierarchy.
Research Methods and Measures
Previous research in this area has been cross-sectional or case-study oriented. To investigate how the locus of decision-making power changes in response to technology, longitudinal data across diverse industries are examined.
Sample
The data were drawn from a stratified random sample of 110 large (250 or more employees) manufacturing establishments studied first in the early 1970s (time T1) and again in the early 1980s (time T2). The response rate was 33%, which is well within the acceptable range for a survey of this nature. The sample includes all major industry groups (as represented by the first two digits of the SIC code). Due to plant closings, lack of participation in the second wave, and missing data, 54 factories provided usable data for this paper. The surviving factories have a more organic structure and a greater technical orientation, producing a restriction of range in the results.
Our study coincides with rapid advances and adoption in PA (Goetsch, 1990), providing an ideal opportunity to observe the role of programmable automation's effects on the distribution of power when the technologies were relatively new innovations to the industry and the firm. The introduction of these technologies to American industry occurred during the time period covered in our longitudinal study. At the firm level, very few firms had adopted any PA at time T1, whereas over half of the firms had adopted some level of PA at time T2. This level of PA use is consistent with other national samples measuring the use of programmable automation in U. S. manufacturing establishments (Majchrzak, Nieva, & Newman, 1986) . Thus, these technologies were relatively new to the industry and the firm. One could speculate that the response to computer technology may be different in the later stages of its introduction to an industry, or after a firm has had years of experience with it, than it was during the early days of its introduction to the industry and the firm. 
Measures
Our measures are based on structured interviews with key personnel in executive management, production, marketing, and human resources, and from plant tours and records. Unless otherwise noted, the same measures were used at T1 and T2.
Programmable automation, which refers to any type of computer-controlled equipment and machinery, was operationalized as the change in the proportion of production capacity accounted for by machinery and equipment at Amber Level 5 (Amber & Amber, 1962 ) from T1 and T2. Amber Level 5 includes such technologies as computer numerical control, robotics, distributed numerical control, distributed process control, and automated material transfer devices. This scale is widely used as the basis for measuring different levels of automation (Cowherd & Levin, 1992; Hage, Collins, Hull, & Teachman, 1993; Marsh, 1992) . This assessment was made by the person in charge of production, who was asked to indicate the percentage of production capacity accounted for by machines at all five levels of the Amber Scale.
Hierarchy is the number of levels in the longest chain of command at the site at T2 (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971) . We also calculated change in levels from T1 to T2. This information was obtained from the organization chart, or from the highest executive at the site if an organization chart was unavailable.
Decentralization of decision-making refers to the locus of decision-making power in the hierarchy at T2. The locus of formal authority was based on the position of the person empowered to take action without consultation with supervisors. If a decision was made by a formula or a set policy, the locus of authority was defined as the level at which an exception could be made or the formula changed.
The locus of influence was based on the lowest-ranking participant in the decisionmaking process who gave information/advice requiring the use of discretionary judgment. The distribution of authority and influence was examined in terms of strategic and line-operating decision domains. Strategic decentralization refers to the average location of authority or influence at T2 for the following items (t~ = .74): set total operating budget at plant, determine production quotas or goals, select suppliers, and decide which type of equipment to buy. Line-operating decentralization refers to the average location of authority or influence at T2 for the following items (~ = .73): determine methods of work, allocate work among production workers, and set the pace of production work.
Decentralization scores were obtained by standardizing for the number of vertical levels at the site. This method creates ratio scores ranging from -1.0 if the decision-making power or influence were located in the lowest ranking worker at the site, to 0 if the power were to reside in the highest executive at site, to +1.0 if the decision-making power were the province of an off-site headquarters, if applicable. For example, if Plant A has three vertical levels in the hierarchy and line-operating decisions are made by workers, Plant A would be assigned a score of-1.0 (-3/3). While Plant B also gives the rank and file authority over line-operating decisions, it has five vertical levels of hierarchy. Since line-operating decisions at Plant B are as decentralized as at Plant A, it too is assigned a score of -1.0 (-5/5) for its locus of decision-making authority. Typically, a score of greater than -.50 indicates that decision-making power resides in the upper echelon of the organization; a score of less than -.50 indicates that it resides in the lower echelon.
This decentralization scale minimizes the potential effects of plant personnel size on the level of decentralization. Larger plants have more levels than small plants and, accordingly, could potentially have decisions made at lower absolute levels--a consistent finding in the comparative organization studies literature (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971) .
Controls
Before examining the relationship of programmable automation to organizational structure and power, it is useful to note that other variables may affect these relationships. Specifically, size, concentration of professionals, technical system development, industry, and industry R&D may impact the relationship between technology and the dynamics within the organization. Studies have shown that size may influence the relationship with differentiation, and the degree to which decentralization occurs (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Zeffane, 1989) . The concentration of professionals may affect the likelihood that decisions are relatively decentralized and the probability that certain types of technology, such as programmable automation, are adopted (Collins et al., 1988) . Technical systems development levels may influence the level of technical inertia and the level of professional-technical personnel (Abernathy & Wayne, 1974; Woodward, 1965) . Industry characteristics, such as growth rates, may affect firms' likelihood of adopting technologies, such as programmable automation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982) . Industry R&D may also affect the likelihood of adopting programmable automation and the concentration of professional employees (National Science Board, 1987) . These variables will be considered when the relationship between programmable automation and the locus of decision-making power is tested.
Personnel size refers to the log number of full-time employees at the plant at T1. We used log personnel size because of the potential non-linearity between size and differentiation (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971 ) and the wide-ranging size of plants in this sample (i.e., 190 to 4,500 employees). Plant personnel growth is the percentage change in the log number of employees from T1 to T2. Programmable automation may indirectly affect plant growth, which may in turn affect the distribution of authority and influence. To account for differences in the direction of change in personnel size, we also included a dummy variable, decline, where the value 'T' represents a loss of personnel size from T1 to T2. This measure is also operationally a control measure for any downsizing.
Concentration of professionals refers to the percentage of professionals at T1.
Professional employees are those whose occupations are defined as such by EEOC and Department of Labor regulations. This variable may affect the likelihood that decisions are relatively decentralized at T1 and the probability that programmable automation will be adopted in more technically developed production operations (Collins et al., 1988) . Change in concentration of professionals consists of the difference in the proportion of professional employees from T1 to T2. Programmable automation results in higher proportions of professional employees, who may, in turn, demand greater participation in the decision-making process. The basis for this group's demand for increased participation is founded on the theory that expertise is a fundamental source of power (French & Raven, 1968) .
Technical system development refers to the level of integration and sophistication of the basic technologies employed in manufacturing at T1 (Collins et al., 1988) . This was measured as the sum of five variables, standardized and weighted according to their respective factor loadings (principal component analysis): Woodward's (1965) technical complexity scale, percentage of mechanically controlled material transfer devices, work flow rigidity (Hickson et al., 1969) , machine automaticity (Amber & Amber, 1962) , and standardized products as a percentage of total sales (oc = .79). More developed technical systems will be likely to exhibit high levels of technological inertia (Abemathy & Wayne, 1974) , and the highest levels often employ a disproportionately high ratio of professional-technical personnel (Woodward, 1965) .
Industry research and development is the ratio of total R&D dollars to the value of shipments in the industry at T1. These data are based on National Science Foundation Indicators for 2-digit industry groupings (the data are unavailable at the 4-digit level, which probably reduces the likelihood of finding significant effects). Firms in R&D-intensive industries are more likely to experience growth, adopt programmable automation, and have a higher concentration of professional employees (National Science Board, 1987) .
We used Technical System Development and Industry R&D at time T1, rather than time T2, or the change from time T1 to T2 for both theoretical and analytical reasons. Regarding technical system development, we were primarily interested in the state of technical system development at the time of adoption, rather than how changes in the technical system might affect PA adoption. Nonetheless, we examined the correlations between PA and technical system development at time T1, time T2, and the change from T1 to T2; technical system development at time T1 had the strongest correlation with PA adoption (negative).
Regarding Industry R&D, the literature suggests that the effects of industry R&D on firm behavior have about a 7 year lag--R&D investments take several years to get to the market, and it takes several years for competing firms to respond to these changes (Hage, 1980) . Industry R&D at time T1 also had a higher correlation with PA than did industry R&D at time T2 or the change from time T1 to T2.
Industry growth is the sum of the average rate of growth in the industry from T1 to T2 for three standardized variables (o~ = .79): the number of establishments with 20 or more employees, the number of employees, and the volume of shipments (standardized dollars). The industries in this sample experienced an average of 4.5% relative growth during this time period, which closely approximates the level of GNP growth nationally (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982) . Firms in growing industries are more likely to adopt programmable automation, and they are also more likely to experience further growth. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 Results Table 1 gives descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Rows 1 and 2 show that from T 1 to T2, the average hierarchy decreased from about five to about four levels. Sixty percent of the cases reported some reduction in the number of vertical levels, 32% reported no change, and 8% reported an increase in the number of vertical levels. The actual number of levels ranged from 3 to 7 at T1, and 2 to 9 at T2. The change in the number of levels from T1 to T2 ranged from a reduction of three levels to an increase in three levels (not shown).
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 describe the levels of strategic authority and influence. Strategic decision-making authority rests with the highest executive at the site (mean = -.04), while the sphere of strategic influence extends about halfway down the hierarchy (mean = -.43). Line-operational authority (mean = -.44) is more centralized than operational influence (mean = -.71). Thus, the locus of authority and influence is lower in the hierarchy for line-operating decisions than for strategic decisions (combined mean ---.25 versus -.58, respectively).
These fmdings are consistent with Jennergren's (1981) argument that organization theory must adopt more complex views of the structure of decision-making power. Collapsing decision domains into an overall decentralization scale, for example, would result in the erroneous conclusion that decisions are relatively centralized at the "director" level (the grand mean for strategic and line-operating authority is -.24), when, in fact, strategic decisions are usually made at the topexecutive level, while operating decisions are usually made at lower levels.
The intercorrelations indicate that strategic authority is significantly correlated with strategic influence (r = .36, p < .01), but not with operational decision-making authority or influence. This supports our expectation that management sharply differentiates between strategic and operational issues. However, strategic influence is positively correlated with both operating authority (r --.39, p < .01) and operating influence (r = .51, p < .01), so top management often extends the sphere of influence over strategic issues to those also engaged in operational matters. There is a strong positive correlation between operating authority and operating influence (r = .56, p < .01).
The number of vertical levels at T2 and change in the number of levels from T1 to T2 are negatively correlated with the centralization of strategic authority (r = -.24, p < .05; r = -. 19, p <. 10, respectively). However, firms with more levels are more likely to centralize operating decisions to higher levels of the organization (r = .28, p _< .05). There is no statistical relationship between levels in the hierarchy and changes in levels in the hierarchy, and strategic influence (r = .15, n.s.; r = .19, n.s.) and operating authority (r = .16, n.s.; r = .08, n.s.). This suggests that power gravitates to middle management in hierarchical organizations.
At T1, only three of the 54 cases used any kind of programmable automation, for an overall mean level of usage of approximately 6% (not shown). By T2, onehalf of the cases had adopted some kind of programmable automation. The mean level of production capacity attributable to PA at T2 was 4.91%; actual levels ranged from 0% to 44% (not shown). Note: tp < .10; *p < .05; **p< .01; ***p < .001. Table 2 examines the hypothesis that programmable automation flattens the hierarchy. Model 1 examines the effects of PA and the number of vertical levels in the hierarchy at T1 on the number of levels at T2. Model 2 adds variables that may jointly influence the adoption of PA and the number of vertical levels. Models 3 and 4 follow the same procedures for changes in the number of vertical levels from T1 to T2. Models 1 and 3 indicate that the number of levels at T1 is the single best predictor of the number of levels at T2 (b = .49, p < .001) and change in vertical levels from T1 to T2 (b = -.29, p < .05). Though we might expect the number of vertical levels at T1 to be the best predictor of future levels, it is noteworthy that firms with more levels at T1 reduce their number of levels over time (Model 3). 2 Models 1 and 3 also suggest that change in programmable automation equipment does not have a simple effect on either the number of vertical levels (b = .08, n.s.) or change in levels (b = .09, n.s.).
Hypothesis 1.
Models 2 and 4 of Table 2 support Hypothesis 1. Change in programmable automation significantly flattens the hierarchy, as illustrated by negative betas for the number of levels (b = -.27, p < .05) and change in levels (b = -.30, p < .05). The underlying negative effect of change in programmable automation on the hierarchy was suppressed by differences in flrrn size, concentration of professionals, and personnel growth, and by industry R&D intensity and growth. Change in concentration of professionals did not have a significant effect on the hierarchy, perhaps because it is highly correlated with the percent of professionals at T1.
Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a argued that there is no relationship between
the use of programmable automation and the locus of strategic authority within the hierarchy. As shown in Table 3 , Model 1 (b = -.10, n.s.) and Model 2 (b = -.26, n.s.) support this hypothesis. 3 Strategic decisions are already highly centralized, and the vested interests of top management keep them so. Moreover, the strategic Hypothesis 3b. Model 7 shows a weak relationship between programmable automation and line-operating influence, but the effect is to centralize rather than decentralize operational influence (b = .26, p <. 10). The centralizing effect of PA JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1999 is magnified in Model 8 (b = .92, p < .001). Thus, these data contradict Hypothesis 3b: managers have not used PA to empower workers. 4
Production technology development (b = .38, p < .05), personnel size (b = -.30, p < .10), changes in personnel size (b = .46, p < .05), the concentration of professionals (b = -.28, p < .05), and changes in concentration of professionals (b = -.77, p < .001) also affect the decentralization of line-operating influence. These results suggest that PA technology may be capable of altering traditional relationships between labor and capital, but that the changes occur among professionals rather than line workers. PA transfers the locus of influence from those engaged in the work to the technical experts designing the systems. However, this effect is partially offset by the tendency of PA adopters to experience growth and to centralize line-operating decisions in the process.
Discussion
The relationship between programmable automation and organizational control and hierarchy is complex. Research findings based on conventional hard automation cannot be transferred directly to programmable automation because PA has fundamentally different properties. The findings of this study show that although limited change in the hierarchy did occur, it was tempered by the historical conditions within the organization and the industry, highlighting the role of organizational inertia in this relationship. The best predictor of number of levels was the previous number of levels. When PA is introduced, it weakens some of these inertial forces by reducing the number of levels in the hierarchy.
Contrary to perceptions that the decentralizing effect of technology on organizational control is old news, programmable automation typically had little or no effect on the locus of strategic decision making, and it centralized operational authority and influence. These results are consistent with the work of Boeker (1989) and Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989) on the inertia of the strategic process and direction. These findings are particularly striking when we consider the fact that fn-ms with decentralized line-operating power are more likely to adopt PA.
These data from the same time period as the Zeffane study (1989) yielded different results on the effect of automation on operational decision making. Although these two studies used different measures of automation, perhaps more interesting is the fact that this study utilized longitudinal data, while Zeffane used cross-sectional data. These differences may underscore two issues: (1) different types of technology have different effects on organizational control; and (2) the relative distribution of organizational control before and after implementation of new technology may be a salient issue. These issues highlight the complexity of the relationship between technology and organizational control.
While the results of these two studies differ, perhaps it is useful to reconsider the comments of Zeffane (1989) early in his paper: decentralization may be a function of the tasks for which technology is used. Zeffane considered automation of the manufacturing and production process as only one component of 17. Our findings more closely parallel those of Marsh (1992) , who focused exclusively on the automaticity of manufacturing plants. Perhaps it is the process of automating the manufacturing function itself that deserves further attention as a possible root of operational decision centralization.
Our findings suggest that the dominant logic with regard to the role of automation within a firm may suffer from inertia. Adopters of programmable automation may view it as the next generation of hard automation, using it primarily for the tasks that hard automation performed. Firms may not fully utilize the flexibility and informating components of PA or may not fully consider the different human resource implications of this new form of automation. Where the skill portfolio necessary to take full advantage of PA is not reexamined, operational power must move up the hierarchy to a level where employee skills and the higher skill demands of the new technology are in equilibrium. While the flexibility and informating components of PA give managers the ability to micro-manage, they must resist this urge if they wish to capitalize on its technical and strategic capabilities.
A model of "constrained managerial choice" may offer a more realistic view of what happens when managers adopt PA. Managers do choose how to use the technology, but these are not simple, ad hoc choices; there are some statistically significant patterns to PA's effects. In other words, managerial choice is constrained by PA' s technical capabilities and by the cognitive, organizational and environmental conditions within which managers operate. Child (1987) rightly noted the need to reexamine the technology-power debate by identifying the context within which decisions are made.
A similar argument has been articulated in the data and information technology literature to rebut the "managerial action imperative"--the idea that managers' desires lead directly to a given organization structure. George and King (1991) note that such an argument neglects the effects of uncontrollable factors outside the organization. In addition, it ignores the fact that managers have limited power and resources, and that they face both technological and cultural inertia within their organizations.
Several factors may account for the finding that PA had a centralizing effect on operating decision-making influence. First, the second wave of data may have been collected during a transition period between the pre-PA era and a fully integrated-PA era. During this transition period, upper-level managers may have found themselves personally responsible for operational decisions which they had neither the time nor the expertise to make effectively. If this is true, then the centralization of decisions would be relatively short-lived since the resultant slow or ineffective decisions would create pressure to place the responsibility elsewhere in the organization. Alternatively, Burkhardt and Brass (1990) show that early adopters of new computer technology increase their network centrality and influence. An increase in the centralization of operational decisions may signal the increased network centrality of those who were early adopters of the new technology; the early adopters of the new technology may be the same individuals now in the position of making operating decisions.
Second, we may have been expecting power shifts at too low a level in the organization. Technical experts with newly found power may have quickly risen to high levels. Recently, Chief Information Officers have become de rigueur in large corporations and are eyeing CEO slots. Like their engineering counterparts, lower-level computer employees may be sending information up this new chain of command, but it is still carried into the CEO's office by a high-level player. Despite the fact that our data show greater centralization of operating influence, they do not allow us to see which actors now occupy those upper levels. It may be that new players are influencing the decision makers, but are doing so from newly remodeled executive suites.
Finally, our results may reflect the decreasing emphasis on lower-level labor in general. As information systems and knowledge workers are becoming the critical mass in modem corporations, it grows less likely that companies will increase their reliance on the advice of less-expert workers. While it may appear that many individual workers are "deskilled" by technological interventions, over the long term at a more macro level, the opposite will be true. In the future, companies may consist of increasingly smaller labor forces of more highly skilled, more highly paid workers, and speed and flexibility will become increasingly valuable. As these changes occur, organizational hierarchies will continue to compress, but the head of the technical employees will sit at the right hand of the CEO, influencing decisions from the top.
In conclusion, managers continue to wield a considerable amount of power following the adoption of PA, but power shifts from craft and line employees to knowledge experts for operational concerns. As computer-controlled technology becomes more and more complex, this f'mding is especially interesting; those who are making decisions and those who are working with the technology have the potential for becoming more and more detached from each other, creating an environment where missed opportunities may become increasingly prevalent. Managers who are interested in promoting an organizational form where decision making is decentralized must understand the effects of computer-controlled automation on decision-making. Indeed, this study suggests that decentralization does not occur except in isolated cases where the organizational structure was already highly decentralized. Those quick to adopt the popular ideology of the horizontal corporation as a panacea would do well to understand how the organization's extant structure and technology may impede the implementation of this strategy. Using programmable automation as a tool to implement a "horizontal organization," where the decisions are made by those closest to the customer or production process, may yield unexpected results. Future work should seek to determine whether these findings are a historical aberration resulting from the novelty of the technology, a function of the tasks the technology is used for, or a harbinger of things to come. No~s 1. Marsh (1992) measured automaticity as the sum of the Amber Scale score for the bulk of the equipment and the most advanced piece of equipment. The average automation score among his firms indicates that traditional, hard automation was the prevalent form. 2. Since we might expect to find that the more levels that were possible to cut would be the best predictor of the number that were cut, we ran parallel analyses that normalized the number cut by the number of levels at T 1. These analyses did not substantially change any of the original relationships. In fact, the number of levels at T1 continued to significantly predict reductions in the number of levels, TI-T2. 
4.
Our tests of Hypotheses 2a-3b are based on the 34 cases that experienced a reduction in the number of hierarchical levels (62% of the sample).
Though not reported herein, we ran the same statistical models for all firms in the sample, and included a dummy variable for the direction of change in hierarchy, where 1 = no change or an increase in hierarchy.
We found (1) a positive, but non-significant relationship between PA and line-operating authority; and (2) a positive and significant relationship between PA and the centralization of line-operating influence. The weakening of the relationship between PA and line-operating authority in the total sample suggests that firms flattening their hierarchy are more likely to centralize line-operating authority when they adopt PA, than firms not experiencing a change in the hierarchy.
